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TALES, TECHS, AND TERRITORIES:
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF BORDERLESSNESS
ON THE INTERNET
ANDREA SLANE*
I
INTRODUCTION
The Internet has often been described as “borderless,” owing to the
technical features of Internet communications that make content accessible to
anyone with a network connection, regardless of his or her location. This
borderlessness has been widely thought both to confound legal regimes relying
on territoriality and to fundamentally create a crisis for jurisdictional
determination of both public- and private-law matters. The borderless Internet
has thus entered into the loose pantheon of phenomena that herald the arrival
of globalization—that vague collection of trends that purportedly erase, or at
least significantly compromise, the authority of intermediary levels of social,
political, economic, and legal orders such as the nation, state, or province.1
The coincidence of the popularization of Internet use and globalization
rhetoric in the 1990s undoubtedly colored the interpretation of the legal
significance of Internet technology. The legal handling of the Internet’s capacity
for uncontrolled crossing of territorial borders informs and shapes our
understanding of the Internet in two ways: first, by framing the substantive
issues arising from the application of local law as a conflict between a
cosmopolitanism that embraces global community and a parochialism that
thwarts global community; second, by framing procedural issues as a contest
between simple and complex approaches to determining the significance of new
legal circumstances arising from the technology or the relationships it enables,
or both. Without such a critical examination into the legal framing of Internet
borderlessness, we fail to truly appreciate that the substantive and procedural
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1. See David Westbrook, Theorizing the Diffusion of Law: Conceptual Difficulties, Unstable
Imaginations, and the Effort To Think Gracefully Nonetheless, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 489, 490–92 (2006).
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aspects of Internet-related cases work together to determine the legal meaning
of Internet technologies.
One of the most striking features of cases that touch more than one
jurisdiction through the Internet is how narrowly the interjurisdictional issues
are often construed. As conflicts-of-laws scholars have complained in other
contexts, courts in Internet cases almost always confine conflicts issues to the
exercise of prescriptive or personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant, which
is collapsed with the determination that local law applies. In other words, courts
in these cases virtually never engage in a full conflicts analysis to determine
whether foreign law ought to be applied.2
The interjurisdictional issues raised in Internet tort cases, for instance, are
quite often determined via the localization of the tort, wherein new
circumstances introduced by Internet technology are converted into facts calling
for a more straightforward exercise of territorial authority over people who
have caused events to occur within a jurisdiction and so are naturally subject to
local law. I do not attempt to explain here why this is so, leaving that for
conflicts-of-laws scholars, but rather seek to set out how courts and scholars cast
Internet technology’s significance in resolving disputes that arise from online
communications.
Cyberlaw scholarship can serve the role for legal scholarship that scienceand-technology-studies scholarship plays for science3—that is, rejecting the
assumption that technologies have fixed forms and neutral meaning, an
assumption that conceals the ways technologies are socially influenced and their
meaning constructed.4 Some have advocated applying such critical methods to
look at the law itself,5—that is, at the ways legal techniques are not natural or
inevitable, and the ways that legal form has agency in the production of legal
conclusions.6
This article takes up both of these theoretical orientations by critically
examining the two levels of private international law’s engagement with
Internet technology, primarily in Canadian Internet-related tort cases with
American defendants: (1) through tracing the various narrative figures that give
legal meaning to Internet borderlessness by invoking the cosmopolitan–

2. Many authors of cyber-law textbooks contribute to this trend by limiting their sections on
jurisdiction primarily to whether content providers will be subjected to local law in foreign jurisdictions.
See, e.g., MICHEAL A. GEIST, INTERNET LAW IN CANADA, 1–125 (Captus Press Inc., 3d ed. 2002)
(2000); DAVID W. QUINTO, LAW OF INTERNET DISPUTES, 12-1–12-72 (2001). These texts, intended for
students and professionals, do not focus primarily on private international law.
3. Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 210, 250 (2007).
4. Id; see also Richard Ford, Against Cyberspace, in THE PLACE OF LAW 147–77 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 2003). Both Cohen and Ford argue that space (and consequently jurisdiction) is socially
constructed. This article is concerned less about the social constructedness of borders per se than about
the ways territorial borders, though accepted by most legal scholars and certainly courts as “real,” are
nonetheless subject to assignment of legal significance and consequently are “constructed” in law.
5. Annelise Riles, A New Agenda for the Cultural Study of Law: Taking on the Technicalities, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 973, 984–85 (2005).
6. Id. at 988.
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parochial rubric, and (2) through tracing the ways these cases promote simple
or complex private-international-law methods as most appropriate to disputes
arising from cross-border communications.
II
THE PRODUCTION OF THE LEGAL MEANING OF INTERNET BORDERLESSNESS
Globalization rhetoric has been described as debased: “It too often involves
exaggerated, misleading, meaningless, superficial, ethnocentric, or just plain
false statements about processes and phenomena that are better discussed in
less hyperbolic terms.”7 The exaggerations can go in utopian or dystopian
directions, leading either to a new, harmonious, global human community, or to
an oppressive homogenization of differences, usually at the expense of lesspowerful populations. The utopian vision tends to strive for freedom from the
law of individual nations in favor of respect for the choices of Internet
participants (to either govern themselves or to choose by whom to be
governed), while the dystiopian vision tends to reject the dissolution of
sovereign authority insofar as doing so recapitulates global power imbalances.
Either vision may be favorably aligned with cosmopolitanism (as providing a
more open and flexible framework for Internet users as individuals, or as
providing a means for otherwise silenced populations to be heard). But so, too,
can either vision be negatively aligned with parochialism (as providing another
means for more powerful parties to ensure the most favorable legal regime will
govern, or as thwarting the march of progress by subjecting Internet users to
multiple local regulations). Although the terms “cosmopolitan” and “parochial”
shape these arguments, either explicitly or implicitly, clearly neither term is
fixed and neither can be deployed to varying rhetorical ends.
For the most part, the production of the legal meaning of Internet
borderlessness has followed two narrative lines, both of which operate within
the cosmopolitan–parochial rubric.8 The first began with the early consideration
of Internet activity as occurring in a virtual place without borders, and therefore
not subject to conventional territorial law (where Internet activities take place
“everywhere and nowhere”).9 This early form of the narrative soon shifted to

7. William Twining, Diffusion and Globalization Discourse, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507, 508 (2006).
8. As Robert Cover has famously stated, “No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart
from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for each
[D]ecalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in which we live.” Robert Cover,
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4–5 (1983).
9. The phrase “everywhere and nowhere” appears in John Perry Barlow’s famous “A Declaration
of the Independence of Cyberspace.” John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of Independence of
Cyberspace (Feb. 8, 1996), http://homes.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2008). The phrase also appears in the lyrics to the 1967 song Hi Ho Silver Lining by Jeff Beck. Barlow
is a former lyricist for the Grateful Dead, and is a co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation is a civil-liberties group whose mission is to defend individual
rights in the digital world. Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Jan.
18, 2008).
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one more fundamentally connected with the territorial world, where universal
accessibility is feared to lead to parochial assertion of state authority in every
jurisdiction—that is, “everywhere and nowhere” became everywhere and
anywhere. This fear lead to a call for defendant-centered rules, as defendants
feared they might be exposed to liability everywhere that Internet content could
be accessed. The second narrative line developed in reaction to the first; in it,
the relevance of borders is reasserted in contexts where “something more” than
mere accessibility is at issue.10 In this narrative line, setting out the contours of
that “something more” becomes an exercise in determining when foreign
audiences should be considered part of the community that is addressed by
Internet communications—where Internet disputes take place here, there (and
everywhere)—since the fact that content is accessible elsewhere (or indeed
everywhere) is deemed not relevant to the dispute.11
These narrative figures ascribe very different legal meanings to Internet
“borderlessness,” even as they all acknowledge the capacity of Internet
communications to facilitate global interactions—that is, to potentially allow a
person to be heard everywhere. Specific instances of these narratives express
different degrees of openness to the position that a new technology requires
rethinking whether substantive local law applies to an event that can be
construed to occur within the territory.
Cases wherein a central determination concerns the relevance of the
recipients of Internet communications as public audiences are particularly
illuminating. Although the legal scholarship on Internet law invokes the
cosmopolitan–parochial rubric more generally, courts or parties to proceedings
invoke it most forcefully in cases dealing with the receipt of information across
borders by public audiences.12 Canadian Internet-defamation cases will
therefore serve as the primary examples through which to explore the instances
in which the above narrative figures play a prominent role. The reasons why
these cases should be the primary locus for working out these tensions are
surely related to the prominent role that information exchange plays in visions
of global community. That these cases involve U.S. defendants and Canadian

10. The phrase “something more” comes from the line of U.S. defamation cases that descended
from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). E.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
l’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 263
(4th Cir. 2002). In those cases, courts interpreted Calder as having required something more than the
mere foreseeability that damage would be caused in a plaintiff’s jurisdiction to allow a suit to be heard
there.
11. U.S. courts have deemed an explicit intent to target a plaintiff’s forum through online
communications to satisfy the “something more” requirement. See, e.g., Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v.
Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000); People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive
Gaming, 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 848–850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). Canadian courts have not limited the
“something more” requirement to audience targeting by a defendant, as will be discussed further with
regard to the “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative. See infra II.B.
12. Defamation cases are the most prominent Internet-based disputes involving receipt of
information by public audiences. The cosmopolitan–parochial rubric is invoked by both the courts and
the parties in the much-discussed Australian defamation case Gutnick v. Dow Jones and Co., Inc.
(2001) V.S.C. 305 (Austl.), aff’d, Dow Jones & Co, Inc. v. Gutnick (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.).
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audiences further speaks to the relatively marginal status of Canadian
audiences in the publics directly addressed by U.S. information providers. In
this way, these cases are fundamentally about globalization, in that information
dissemination is a key paradigm of the global.
A. From Everywhere and Nowhere to Everywhere and Anywhere
It is by now nearly legend that the earliest champions of the Internet’s
borderlessness tended to embrace the libertarian possibilities of a
communications environment unmoored from physical restrictions and not
subject to the governments that rule over the physical world.13 The most famous
and storied advocate of this position is John Perry Barlow, one of the founders
of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, whose 1996 manifesto, “A Declaration
of the Independence of Cyberspace,”14 is easily the most oft-quoted document
of the early era.15 Barlow stated that existing territorial governments have no
sovereignty in cyberspace, because “[c]yberspace does not lie within your
borders.”16 Indeed, as he puts it, cyberspace “is a world that is both everywhere
and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live.”17 Cyberspace is thereby
understood as a curiously de-territorialized space, an exciting possibility for a
new frontier fundamentally outside the reach of existing laws and regulations.
The popular variant of the cosmopolitan vision of the Internet that
embraces this new frontier and what it can achieve for global human society is
amply illustrated in advertising campaigns for Internet-related services from the
1990s. These ads invested global access to the Internet with a capacity to unite
all peoples of the world in the common purpose of information exchange. A
Microsoft advertising campaign from 1995, for instance, featured an Internet
accessed by ethnically diverse people typing or reading aloud in myriad
languages. The advertisement culminated in Microsoft’s 1994–2002 company
slogan: “Where do you want to go today?”18 The direct address and clarity of
this slogan implies that anyone is free to travel, via the Internet, anywhere he or
she pleases. This mode of address deliberately elides any differences (political,

13. Philip Agre notes that reactions to Internet technology ran the whole political spectrum: by his
typology, the libertarian left and right, alike, projected images of decentralization and destruction of
existing institutions, from the left as an opportunity for radical democracy, from the right as an
opportunity to allow the market to determine the shape of the future. The nonlibertarian left
approached the Internet as yet another instrument of capitalist domination and expansion, while the
nonlibertarian right saw it as yet another instrument of moral decay. Philip E. Agre, Cyberspace as
American Culture, 11 SCI. AS CULTURE 171, 185 (2002).
14. Barlow, supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of
Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1207, 1212 (2002); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 439, 447 (2003).
16. Barlow, supra note 9.
17. Id.
18. A valuable database of advertisements of multi- and transnational corporations is available
online: Robert Goldman et al., Landscapes of Capital: Representing Time, Space and Globalization in
Corporate Advertising, http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pagesintro/mapfive.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
This database accompanies the analytical project of sociologists Robert Goldman and Stephen Papson.
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economic, or cultural) that would surely make free travel, even via the Internet,
more difficult for some world populations than for others. A similar campaign
was run by Canadian telecommunications company Nortel Networks,
prominently featuring their likewise difference-leveling slogan:“What do you
want the Internet to be?”19 U.S. and Canadian companies shared a similar vision
of limitless possibility and a message of universal empowerment.
Legal scholars David Johnson and David Post most famously took on the
challenge of considering what law in this sort of cyberspace would look like. In
their seminal 1996 article, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace,
Johnson and Post took seriously the idea of cyberspace as a separate place by
positing that Internet users crossed a border more significant than any
territorial border when they went online (that is, the border between online and
offline) and so should evolve their own norms and rules of behavior rather than
be governed by offline laws.20 Support for private ordering by Internet users has
been widespread,21 often characterizing online forums as cosmopolitan and as
threatened by the incursion of parochial norms by national legal systems.22
Casting the assertion of national interest as parochial rests on an assumption
that crossing multiple borders negates the legitimacy of claims by any one
territory. Johnson and Post, for instance, write:
Governments cannot stop electronic communications from coming across their
borders, even if they want to do so. Nor can they credibly claim a right to regulate the
Net based on supposed local harms caused by activities that originate outside their
borders and that travel electronically to many different nations. One nation’s legal
23
institutions should not monopolize rule-making for the entire Net.

For Johnson and Post, the claim that territorially bound authorities cannot
make a legitimate claim to regulate cross-border communications that cause
local harm follows from the fact that these same communications “travel
electronically to many different nations.”24 In other words, the local
jurisdiction’s claim is vacated by the mere fact of the global nature of the
communication. Such visions of Internet borderlessness privilege the global
over the local, invoking a public-policy rationale for preferring international

19. Robert
Goldman
et
al.,
Making
it
Social,
Making
it
Emotional,
http://it.stlawu.edu/~global/pageslandscapes/nortelsign33.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
20. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
L. REV. 1367, 1378–79 (1996).
21. See, e.g., Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Space, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 96 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 555 (1998).
22. See, e.g., John T. Delacourt, The International Impact of Internet Regulation, 38 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 207, 234 (1997) (“The national regimes imposed by the United States, Germany, and China apply
parochial norms to a cosmopolitan space in an attempt to constrain a medium whose principal value is
its flexibility.”); Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant Law, 53 UNIV. OF
TORONTO L.J. 265, 281 (“Like the medieval Law Merchant, a twenty-first-century Law Merchant is
evolving that is cosmopolitan in nature and transcends the parochial interests of nation states.”).
23. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1390.
24. Id.
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over national interests, in which “international” is often collapsed with
individual content provider interests.
Embedded within this privileging of the global over the local (via the
cosmopolitan–parochial rubric) is another more-subtle move that translates
Barlow’s de-territorialized cyberspace into a phenomenon territorialized in
ways that law more readily understands. Specifically, although Barlow’s
cyberspace is “everywhere and nowhere,”25 Johnson and Post’s is “everywhere
but nowhere in particular.”26 Under this modified conception of Barlow’s
cyberspace, cyberspace no longer “does not lie within your borders,”27 but
instead “cut[s] across territorial border.”28 Despite their advocacy for selfgovernance,29 Johnson and Post’s cyberspace shifts the conceptual frame from
one structured by an opposition between physical and virtual to one structured
by an opposition between global and local, which makes Internet technology
more readily manageable by private-international-law approaches.
The “everywhere but nowhere in particular”30 variation on Barlow’s
legendary vision appears in cases in which courts have stated that a defendant’s
address to the world at large neutralizes the claims of any one specific locale.31
Although not truly “nowhere”— since at least the defendant’s home forum is
presumed to have authority over the dispute—the cosmopolitan–parochial
rubric interprets the nonspecific address as negating the legal significance of
information flowing into a specific territory.32 In other words, when the world at
large is the audience, parochial norms do not apply.
With the shift from physical–virtual to global–local, exercising jurisdiction
and potentially applying local law became a hotbed of controversy in Internetbased disputes.33 The utopian vision of an alternate universe self-governed by
participants gave way to the earth-bound desire to be everywhere but not be
subject to legal liability anywhere except in one’s home jurisdiction. This is the
legal narrative underpinning the utopian possibilities expressed in the Microsoft
and Nortel advertisements described above,34 or in the advocacy of such publicinterest projects as the OpenNet Initiative35 and the Global Internet Liberty

25. Barlow, supra note 9.
26. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1378.
27. Barlow, supra note 16.
28. Johnson & Post, supra note 20, at 1367.
29. Id. at 1383.
30. Id. at 1376.
31. See, e.g., Am. Info. Corp. v. Am. Infometrics, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 2d 696, 700 (D. Md. 2001)
(federal court action in the United States); Desjean v. Intermix Media Inc., [2006] F.C. 1395 at para. 42
(Can.) (federal court action in Canada).
32. Am. Info. Corp, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 700; Desjean, F.C. 1395 para. 35.
33. Am. Info. Corp, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 700; Desjean, F.C. 1395 para. 35. See also Panavision Int’l v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Bellsouth Corp., 199 F.3d
1343, 1347–50 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 1999);
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419 (9th Cir. 1997).
34. See supra II.A.
35. OpenNet Initiative, Home, http://opennet.net/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
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Campaign.36 Along with the desire to be everywhere came the anxiety that the
freedom (and power) to be global would be squelched by overzealous courts
asserting parochial interests and imposing local laws on content providers
merely because that content could be accessed within those courts’ jurisdictions.
This double-edged “everywhere and anywhere” narrative became common in
court cases,37 commentary,38 and scholarship,39 thereby elevating the frequency
and prominence of public-policy arguments against the assumption of
jurisdiction in Internet cases.

36. Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Home, http://www.gilc.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); see
also Electronic Frontier Foundation, Home, http://www.eff.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008); Center for
Democracy and Technology, Mission and Principles, http://www.cdt.org/mission/ (last visited Jan. 15,
2008).
37. See, e.g., Am. Info. Corp., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 701 (“In the case at bar, the burden on the
defendant at least balances the plaintiff’s interest in convenience, and the availability of jurisdiction
anywhere in the country, over anyone with a Web site that accepts a rudimentary form inquiry, hardly
promotes the most efficient resolution of controversies.”); GTE New Media Servs., Inc., 199 F.3d at
1350 (“When stripped to its core, GTE’s theory of jurisdiction rests on the claim that, because the
defendants have acted to maximize usage of their websites in the District, mere accessibility of the
defendants’ websites establishes the necessary ‘minimum contacts’ with this forum. [internal citation
omitted] This theory simply cannot hold water. Indeed, under this view, personal jurisdiction in
Internet-related cases would almost always be found in any forum in the country.”); Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d at 419 (“While there is no question that anyone, anywhere could access that home page and
thereby learn about the services offered, we cannot see how from that fact alone it can be inferred that
Cybersell FL deliberately directed its merchandising efforts toward Arizona residents.”). In Canada,
see, e.g., Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk (Braintech II), [1999] 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 para. 63 (Can.) (“It would
create a crippling effect on freedom of expression if, in every jurisdiction the world over in which access
to Internet could be achieved, a person who posts fair comment on a bulletin board could be haled
before the courts of each of those countries where access to this bulletin could be obtained.”); Desjean
v. Intermix Media Inc., [2006] F.C. 1395 para. 35 (Can.) (“It would be manifestly unfair to subject
Intermix to this Court’s jurisdiction since it would, in effect, mean a U.S.-based operator of a website,
with no business assets in Canada and no physical presence in the jurisdiction, could be sued in this
country as well as in any other country from which a plaintiff might choose to download its products.”).
38. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton & Gregory A. Castanias, Tangled Web: Personal Jurisdiction and
the Internet, 24 NO. 2 LITIGATION 27, 27 (1998) (“Since the World Wide Web typically is viewable from
any computer on the Internet, anywhere in the world, does the owner of a Website therefore have
‘minimum contacts’ sufficient to be haled into court anywhere his Website might cause injury?”); Rieko
Mashima, Problem of the Supreme Court’s Obscenity Test Concerning Cyberporn: Community
Standards Remaining after ACLU v. Reno, 16 THE COMPUTER LAWYER 23, 23 (1999) (“Information
on the Internet can be received virtually by anybody anywhere without the sender’s notice, thus
reinforcing the pressure to comply with the standard of the strictest community should a sender hope to
avoid potential trouble.”).
39. See, e.g., Michael S. Rothman, It’s a Small World After All: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet
and the Global Marketplace, 23 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 127, 186 (1999) (“With increasing frequency,
courts are being faced with factual situations where a defendant’s contacts with the forum state meet
the requirements of ‘minimum contacts,’ yet do not comport with traditional notions of ‘fair play and
substantial justice’ inherent in the due process analysis (or the international standard of
reasonableness). Consequently, cases involving the Internet will increase pressure on this second prong
of the due process analysis and courts should use this prong to successfully protect defendants.”);
Kendrick D. Nguyen, Redefining the Threshold for Personal Jurisdiction: Contact and the Presumption
of Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 253, 279 (2003) (“With the presumption-of-reasonableness approach in
practice, we can hope to reinstate the equilibrium between personal jurisdiction and twenty-first
century American society. It is inevitable that personal jurisdiction will evolve to adapt to the
environment sooner or later, but we undoubtedly prefer it to be sooner. As we have the ability to make
that happen now, courts should act before the defunct legal concept of minimum contacts wreaks havoc
in society by perpetuating unfairness and public distrust.”).
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The initial impetus for the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative came from
cases in which courts did find liability for mere accessibility on a foreseeability
basis: to choose to post information on the Internet is to know that you may be
liable anywhere in the world.40 This pure-foreseeability approach had a rare and
short-lived legal life, replaced by variously phrased requirements of “something
more” than mere accessibility, which is the central project of the “here, there
(and everywhere)” narrative figure discussed below.41 Yet the threat of
expansive exercising of personal jurisdiction based on mere accessibility and the
resulting application of unfavorable local law has had much greater prominence
as a rhetorical strategy. This strategy has been routinely deployed by
defendants seeking to avoid liability in foreign jurisdictions for online content,
regardless of their degree of activity in relation to the forum. Indeed, insofar as
the “something more” requirement is vague and leaves open the possibility that
not much more than mere accessibility is sufficient for a court to exercise
jurisdiction, it invites this kind of counterargument.
The first Canadian case to consider Internet-based jurisdictional issues was
Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk (Braintech I).42 To date, it is the only Canadian case
to consider liability for mere accessibility, and it has consequently been the only
case to employ the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative.43 Braintech I was an
action brought in British Columbia to enforce a Texas defamation judgment
obtained by a company with some presence in Texas against a British Columbia
resident who posted comments on an online bulletin board.44 The trial court
ruled the Texas judgment enforceable,45 reasoning that the suit had sufficient
connection with Texas because of the plaintiff’s presence in Texas and the
presence of some of the plaintiff’s investors in Texas, and accepted the Texas
court’s holding that the defamation was published in Texas via the Internet. In
other words, the harm had been suffered in Texas.46 On appeal, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal reversed.47 It held that the other factors connecting
the dispute to Texas became relevant only if the last conclusion, that the tort
occurred partly in Texas, was valid.48 The court’s reduction of the connectingfactors method to a variant of a single-situs test is a prominent example of the

40. See, e.g., Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1044 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (ordering foreign defendant, based in Italy, to be held in contempt of court for violating court’s
prior injunction enjoining defendant from selling or distributing goods, which infringed on a U.S.
trademark, in the United States); Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 165 (D. Conn.
1996) (court asserted territorial jurisdiction in a trademark-infringement action noting that by posting
advertising on the Internet, defendant directed its advertising toward “not only the state of
Connecticut, but to all states”).
41. See infra II.B.
42. Braintech I, [1998] 88 A.C.W.S. 565 (Can.), rev’d, Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 (Can.).
43. See Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 para. 62 (Can.), rev’d [1998] 88 A.C.W.S. 565 (Can.).
44. Braintech I, 88 A.C.W.S. 565 para. 20 (Can.).
45. Id. para. 22.
46. Id. para 20.
47. Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 paras. 69–70 (Can.).
48. Id. para. 58.
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draw toward simplicity as an appropriate procedural solution to disruptions
caused by Internet technology.49 The “everywhere and anywhere” narrative
figure justifies the court’s procedural move via a purely negative public-policy
rationale—namely, that mere accessibility is not enough to warrant the exercise
of jurisdiction, since such a parochial intrusion would hinder the cosmopolitan
future of the Internet.
For the British Columbia Court of Appeal, the significance of where the tort
occured was twofold: it highlighted the evidentiary deficiencies that
demonstrated neither actual readership in Texas nor intent on the part of the
defendant to address a Texas audience.50 The court noted that the defendant did
not manifest an intention “to enter any particular jurisdiction” and so “[i]t
would create a crippling effect on freedom of expression if, in every jurisdiction
the world over in which access to Internet could be achieved, a person who
post[ed] fair comment on a bulletin board could be ha[u]led before the courts of
each of those countries where access to this bulletin could be obtained.”51 The
“everywhere and anywhere” narrative allowed the British Columbia Court of
Appeal to discount the other connecting factors considered by the trial judge
regarding the plaintiff’s ties to Texas while justifying the privileging of global
address over local effects.
Subsequent to Braintech II, Canadian private-international-law cases
involving online defamation appear to have diverged from the dominant U.S.
approach shared by the Canadian court in Braintech II—an approach that
makes “targeting” of territorial audiences by defendant publishers a primary
consideration.52 This trend has generated commentary claiming that the
substantive differences in the defamation laws of the United States and of
Commonwealth countries have pushed the former and latter in different
directions.53 A 2007 review of media law appearing in the Harvard Law Review,
for instance, suggests that “[a]lthough these inconsistent jurisdictional tests are
a matter of procedure, they stem from different substantive laws and from
Commonwealth courts’ underlying unfriendliness to U.S. free speech
protections.”54 There are at least two problems with this assessment. The first
problem is that these comments cast the reasoning of Commonwealth countries
in negative terms—that is, as anti-American, where “American” stands in for
expansive free-speech protections that are deemed to be most appropriate to
the promotion of a cosmopolitan and progressive Information Society. The
second problem is that such comments inadequately analyze the so-called
“procedural variances” as a key arena for parsing the legal technologies that are

49. See infra II.B.
50. See Braintech II, 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 para. 65 (Can.).
51. Id. paras. 62–63.
52. See, e.g., Bangoura v. Washington Post, [2004] 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (Can.), rev’d, [2005] 258
D.L.R. (4th) 341 (Can.); Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 (Can.).
53. Developments in the Law, The Law Of Media, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2007).
54. Id.
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used to reach positive (rather than purely negative) ends. An alternative way to
understand the divergence of Commonwealth countries from the United States
would be to note the decline in the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative’s
potency as a deterrent. This decline is accompanied in Commonwealth
countries by a turn toward using legal technologies to work out a positive
rationale for reclaiming the legal relevance of the receipt of information to the
information exchange that is so central to cosmopolitan visions of global online
communications.
In the much-publicized- and discussed Australian defamation case, Gutnick
v. Dow Jones and Co., Inc., for instance, the defendant, a U.S. publisher,
attempted to persuade the court to decline to hear the case even though the
plaintiff had established that the defendant had Australian subscribers to its
online publication, thereby manifesting at least some intention to reach an
Australian audience even by the U.S.-favored “targeting” standard.55 The
defendant also argued that for any court other than one sitting in defendant’s
home jurisdiction to hear the case would result in unlimited liability worldwide
for online publishers.56 The Victoria court rejected this argument, noting that,
although the defendant argued “such a narrow rule was appropriate for the age
of globalization[,] [i]t was, of course, also appropriate for his client.”57 With this
statement, the trial court deflated the public-policy argument that invoked a
particular vision of cosmopolitanism as merely a guise for its rhetorical
opposite—namely, the promotion of two parochial interests. One was national:
that “every hit on a U.S. Web site that unearthed a defamatory statement
simultaneously created the U.S. forum to decide the issue.”58 Another, the most
parochial interest of all, was an individual self-interest.59 Although there is
undoubtedly resistance in the trial court’s judgment to adopting a principle that
would result in U.S. courts’ dominating online content disputes,60 the court’s
reasoning is less hostile to U.S. law per se than it is to the defendant’s efforts to
negate the significance of the Australian audiences for U.S. online publications.
It is this aspect of Dow Jones that has been picked up by Canadian courts.
Courts in four Internet-jurisdiction cases have cited Dow Jones, including the
Supreme Court of Canada.61 Dow Jones stands mainly for the proposition that a

55. (2001) V.S.C. 305 para. 1–2 (Austl.) [hereinafter Gutnick], aff’d sub nom. Dow Jones & Co.
Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 (Austl.) [hereinafter Dow Jones]. Some critics have
mischaracterized the decision as holding that accessibility alone is enough. See, e.g., Yulia A.
Timofeeva, Worldwide Prescriptive Jurisdiction in Internet Content Controversies: A Comparative
Analysis, 20 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199, 201 (2005) (“Australia exercised even more expansive authority and
delivered a defamation judgment against a foreign respondent whose contact with the country was
limited to defamatory Internet material accessible within Australia.”).
56. Gutnick, VSC 305 para. 16.
57. Id. para. 17.
58. Id. para. 76.
59. Id. para. 74.
60. Id. para. 73.
61. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Ass’n of Internet
Providers (SOCAN III), [2004] 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.); Bangoura v. Washington Post, [2004] 235
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territory in which Internet content is received may, in appropriate
circumstances, assume jurisdiction over a dispute arising from that content.62
The possibility of exercising jurisdiction over disputes arising from content
received in Canada demarcates the limits around the “everywhere and
anywhere” narrative, such that Internet borderlessness translates into unlimited
liability only when courts truly base their authority on mere accessibility alone,
as opposed to proof of actual receipt by a more-than-incidental audience.
The second narrative line that gives meaning to Internet borderlessness—
“here, there (and everywhere)”—clarifies that information crossing a particular
border has legal consequences. It does this by starting from the premise that the
capability of crossing all borders does not necessarily negate the significance of
a specific, local-border crossing.
B. Here, There (and Everywhere)
In response to legal scholars who argued for treating Internet
communications as exempt from more local controls,63 other legal scholars
reasserted the significance of territorial authority in a variety of ways. Jack
Goldsmith, for instance, argued against Johnson and Post’s argument for selfgovernance by considering claims arising from the Internet’s disruptiveness to
be overblown.64 For Goldsmith, the Internet posed no truly new problems that
private international law could not handle by established means.65 In his recent
book with Tim Wu, Goldsmith’s assessment is historically borne out, as national
governments are chronicled to have succeeded in asserting authority over
Internet communications that enter their territory, through various coercive
Goldsmith and Wu cast themselves as realists, deflating the
means.66
exaggerated rhetoric surrounding the threat posed by the assertion of national
authority while casting as naïve the thought that nation-states were ever really
going away.67
Other scholars, such as Neil Netanel and Joel Reidenberg, are less focused
on the will of existing territorial nations than they are on the implications of
embracing means of deciding legal disputes that thwart the assertion of

D.L.R. (4th) 564, rev’d, [2005] 258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 (Can.); Barrick Gold Corp. v. Blanchard & Co.,
[2003] 9 B.L.R. 316 (Can.); Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 (Can.).
62. Dow Jones, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 para. 54 (Austl.).
63. See, e.g., Delacourt, supra note 22, at 34; Trakman, supra note 22, at 281.
64. Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1221 (1998). Goldsmith
identified the slippery slope of the “everywhere and anywhere” narrative, noting that “this potential
threat of liability is relatively insignificant and does not come close to the skeptics’ broad descriptive
claims about massive multiple regulation of individual users.”Id.
65. Id. at 1206.
66. JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 184 (2006).
67. Id. at 10.
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democratically established legal principles.68 There are traces of these
viewpoints in the Gutnick and Dow Jones decisions, in which the assertion of
Australian jurisdiction is consciously deployed as a counterweight to
exaggerated “everywhere and anywhere”-style rhetoric.69
Paul Schiff Berman takes a different approach to reasserting the local. On
the one hand, he criticizes the inappropriate assertion of territorial authority
(his main examples come from U.S. courts that engage private-international-law
methods inadequately, if at all); on the other, he proposes that private
international law could take account of multiple community affiliations that are
not strictly territorial or citizenship-based by taking a “cosmopolitan pluralist”
approach.70 In doing so, Berman reclaims the term “cosmopolitan” from the
global in the service of the local, by which he means something other than mere
national interest.
Although Berman’s cosmopolitan–pluralist approach is cast as an
alternative to existing approaches to Internet disputes, the assumption of
jurisdiction over Internet disputes in Canada is arguably already showing
indications of being something other than merely the assertion of territorial
sovereignty.71 The “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative line builds on
private international law’s capacity to legally manage events occurring in more
than one place (“both here and there”72) and refines this observation for the
Internet context by considering the circumstances in which “something more”
than mere accessibility of Internet content warrants a court’s hearing a dispute.
The exercise of setting out the “something more” is an effort toward
determining when a foreign audience is deemed to become legally relevant—
based not on territoriality per se, but rather on something closer to Berman’s
notion of community affiliation.
Burke v. NYP Holdings, in which a British Columbia court faced a
defamation action against a U.S. publisher, is a particularly interesting
Canadian example of the “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative.73 Although
a British Columbia readership could be established, the manifest intention by
the defendant publisher to cultivate that readership was absent.74 The court held
that it could properly exercise jurisdiction and apply local law because it was
foreseeable that plaintiff would bring suit in the forum. The court’s
foreseeability determination rested on two findings. First, plaintiff had an
68. See Neil W. Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View From Liberal Democratic
Theory, 88 CAL. L. REV. 395, 405 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 261, 263 (2002).
69. See Dow Jones, (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 para. 54 (Austl.); Gutnick (2001) VSC 305 para. 76
(Austl.); see also supra II.A.
70. Paul S. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 478 (2002); Paul S.
Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefining Governmental Interests in a
Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2005).
71. See, e.g., Burke v. NYP Holdings, 48 B.C.L.R. 363 (Can.).
72. Libman v. R, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 para. 63 (Can.) (case concerning multi-jurisdictional fraud).
73. 48 B.C.L.R. 363 at paras. 32–33 (Can.).
74. Id. at paras. 3–4, 8.
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established reputation in British Columbia. Second, it was foreseeable that a
British Columbian audience would be interested in plaintiff’s online newspaper
column, regardless of whether the foreign defendant intended to address that
audience.75 The determination of a foreseeable British Columbia audience
centers on the fact that the original event that inspired the column had occurred
in Vancouver at a Canucks hockey game and had enjoyed ongoing interest in
British Columbia, and that the allegedly defamatory statements were about a
person of interest to British Columbians—namely plaintiff Brian Burke, thenGeneral Manager of the Canucks.76 When combined with the strong crossborder reputation of the defendant’s newspaper (the New York Post) and its
sports columnist (Larry Brooks), these facts, the court held, made it foreseeable
that the online posting of the story would be read in British Columbia by both
ordinary readers and the by British Columbia media—even if no paper editions
were sold in British Columbia.77
Although a prominent line of U.S. defamation cases descending from Calder
v. Jones78 similarly raised what one court called the “geographic focus” of a
story as a relevant consideration,79 the Burke decision differs from U.S. cases in
that it further considers the scope of the content provider’s influence to be
relevant. The court in Burke wrote,
While the Defendants have little or no business connection in British Columbia, it is
clear that the Post is a major newspaper in what many describe as the financial capital
of the United States which, in turn, is described by many as the most powerful country
in the world. By establishing a website which is available on the Internet worldwide, it
is reasonably foreseeable that the story set out in the Column would follow Mr. Burke
80
to where he resided. The concept of a “worldwide web” is aptly named.

75. The Burke decision can be usefully paired with Young v. New Haven Advocate, in which the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a lower court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a suit
arising from allegedly defamatory statements about a Virginia prison warden that were published in an
article in the online version of a Connecticut newspaper. 315 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2002). The Young
decision concerned a local newspaper, however, whereas Burke dealt with a newspaper with
international reputation. A tendency to overlook such important distinctions affecting the
determination of the foreseeability of particular audiences is evident in the note, A ‘Category-Specific’
Legislative Approach to the Internet Personal Jurisdiction Problem in U.S. Law, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1617, 1629 (2004), where the editors compare Dow Jones and Young, stating that the court in Young
“could not exercise jurisdiction over two Connecticut newspapers in a defamation action brought by a
Virginia resident simply because the allegedly defamatory articles were available on websites.” As
discussed above in part II.A, Dow Jones did not assume jurisdiction merely because the defamatory
article was available on websites, but rather because it was actually accessed in Australia by Australian
subscribers.
76. Burke v. NYP Holdings, 48 B.C.L.R. 363 para. 32 (Can.). The event was the “sucker-punch” hit
by Canucks-player Todd Bertuzzi on Colorado Avalanche player Steve Moore that resulted in
Bertuzzi’s being charged with assault causing bodily harm. ESPN.com, Canucks Star Charged With
Assault (Jun. 25, 2004), http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1827388 (last visited Apr. 19,
2008).
77. Id. para. 29.
78. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
79. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 476 (2002). In Calder, the Court considered the most relevant
fact to be, instead, that the defendant-publisher had a significant print circulation in California, where
the plaintiff lived and worked. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 785 (1984).
80. Burke v. NYP Holdings, 48 B.C.L.R. 363 para. 33.
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What the court articulates here is the position that not all publications are equal
on the Internet, in that a newspaper with an international reputation must own
up to its international influence and cannot relegate to legal irrelevance online
audiences from jurisdictions with a substantial connection to a story.81
The Burke decision has been called into question by some commentators82
who note that the case relies in part on the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
decision in Bangoura v. Washington Post (Bangoura I), which was overturned
on appeal.83 However, the facts in Burke differ substantially from those in
Bangoura I in that the geographic focus of the impugned article in Bangoura I
was not Ontario, let alone anywhere in Canada, and the Bangoura I plaintiff did
not even live in Canada at the time of the initial publication.84 The Ontario
Court of Appeal thus rightly considered the connection between Ontario and
the publication to be minimal and so not sufficient to establish jurisdiction.85 In
other words, the issue of the relevance of the Canadian audience was
overlooked by the trial judge in Bangoura I, so jurisdiction was improperly
exercised on the mere basis of plaintiff’s current residence. 86
Although substantive differences between U.S. and Canadian defamation
law are undeniable, they do not account entirely for the move to consider the
relevance of Canadian audiences within the scope of a defendant’s sphere of
influence as part of the private-international-law process. Indeed, Canadian
courts have considered the significance of receiving online communications in
their jurisdiction analyses, and have not limited this approach exclusively to
defamation actions.87 This has shaped the meaning of Internet “borderlessness”
in Canada to include the possibility that receipt in some cases may be enough to
warrant the exercise of local jurisdiction. In Burke, the court appeared to accept
that, regardless of intention, if a major newspaper chooses to write about a
British Columbia-based person concerning a British Columbia-based event, a
British Columbia audience for that content exists.88 In other words, another way
to frame the “here, there (and everywhere)” narrative is to consider it engaged
in legally inscribing wider borders around the relevant online community
regardless of geographic territory—that is, to be defining the relevant public as

81. Similar reasoning appeared in Wiebe v. Bouchard, in which the British Columbia Supreme
Court held that a British Columbia resident could bring an action for defamation against a Quebec
author of a report issued by the federal government since the audience for the report was nationwide.
[2005] B.C.L.R. 47 (Can.).
82. See Brian MacLeod Rogers, Commentary: Appeal Case Helps Close the Door to “Libel
Tourists,” 25 LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct. 28, 2005.
83. [2004] 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564 (Can.), rev’d, Bangoura v. Washington Post (Bangoura II), [2005]
258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 (Can.).
84. Bangoura II, [2005] 258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 para. 22 (Can.).
85. See id. para. 46.
86. Id. para. 29.
87. See, e.g., Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass’n of Internet
Providers (SOCAN I), [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 (Can.), rev’d in part, SOCAN III, [2004] 240 D.L.R.
(4th) 193 (Can.).
88. Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 at para. 29 (Can.).
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that with which a defendant’s Internet activity is engaged and so to set the scale
of that activity in a globalized online world.89 Through the “here, there (and
everywhere)” narrative, courts can claim that if the public addressed by the
defendant’s activity meaningfully includes the population of the forum
jurisdiction, then the forum court may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction and to
apply local law.
Although much of the rhetorical work is done by these narratives, the legal
meaning of the Internet’s borderlessness is also shaped by courts’ procedural
rules and is rationalized as most appropriate to address the novel issues raised
by Internet technology.
III
TECHNIQUES MEET TECHNOLOGIES
Private international law has been characterized as being particularly
enamored of the technical or, more properly, both enamored and repelled by its
own preoccupation with the technical—that is, the rules, lists of factors, and
other doctrines and methods for resolving disputes.90 It is no wonder, then, that
a technological phenomenon culturally invested with the potential to achieve
either internationalism or non-nationalism would not only use private
international law’s tools, but would both inspire complaints about their
inadequacy and demands for new tools. Another layer of drama playing out in
the interjurisdictional cases involving the Internet, then, is far more
fundamental: namely, it is a debate about the function of law as an instrument,
and, further, what sort of legal instrument is most compatible with the
narratives of the greater public good derived from global communications.
This drama plays out in two primary contexts: (1) in cases in which private
international law’s encounter with the Internet inspires a search for simple and
uniform rules for determining interjurisdictional legal issues, often basing those
rules in the mechanics of Internet technology itself;91 and (2) in cases preferring
multiple-factor analysis as a way to accommodate the complexities of crossborder relationships created via Internet communications.92 Although the
cosmopolitan–parochial rubric centrally shapes the consideration of the
substantive-law issues and the public-policy rationales put forward in cases

89. See Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 70, at 436–37. Berman states that
“the exercise of jurisdiction may encourage corporate officials to rethink their sense of responsibility to
communities far beyond the boundaries of their corporate headquarters.” Id. Berman goes on to say
that “the assertion of community membership is relevant to discussions of Internet jurisdiction as well”
and that “the growth of electronic communications is closely linked to our increasing global economic
and psychological interdependence.” Id. at 437. “Given this change in economic and psychological
interdependence,” Berman writes, “it would not be surprising to see the definition of community
membership change as well. And if jurisdiction is one of the ways we express our intuitions about
community membership, then jurisdictional rules, in turn, must evolve.” Id.
90. Riles, supra note 5, at 977.
91. See infra III.A.
92. See infra III.B.
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dealing with the cross-border flow of information, preference for simplicity or
complexity is the primary rubric through which the appropriateness of
procedural approaches have been debated. The simplicity–complexity rubric is
of course not unique to Internet disputes. Rather, it has a long history in
conflicts case law and scholarship. Some conflicts scholars have championed
complexity as the more sophisticated and better way to deal with the publicpolicy needs of modern life.93 Others have championed simplicity as a return to
a more-principled concern for basic, fundamental rights that have been lost.94
Although promoting complexity or simplicity can be (and has been) at times
connected with particular ideological orientations toward the role of law, in the
Internet context, the orientation toward simplicity or complexity is not clearly
aligned with any particular worldview, and both orientations claim that the
chosen approach will be more fair and more likely to achieve just results. The
following analysis of the procedural approaches in Internet cases highlights
simplicity and complexity as legal vocabulary employed by courts, vocabulary
that is particularly potent whenever the law encounters a new or perceived-tobe-new phenomenon.95
A. Single-Situs Tests and Technological Determinism
In the Internet’s initial encounter with private international law, a common
response of courts to the bewildering circumstance of Internet communication
has been to simplify the legal analysis.96 Courts often reached for classic
formalist rules to determine the jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues, such as
lex loci delicti: the place where the tort was committed determines the forum
and choice of law.97 Embracing formalist rules such as this transforms the
private-international-law exercise into a matter of determining where torts
committed via Internet technology occur, rather than requiring the balancing
and weighing of multiple factors that shape the relationships between the
parties and the various locations implicated in the dispute. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal’s decision in Braintech II 98 boils down all the

93. See, e.g., Walter Wheeler Cook, An Unpublished Chapter of the Logical and Legal Bases of the
Conflict of Laws, 37 ILL. L. REV. 418, 423 (1943). As Riles writes, discussing and quoting Cook, “Cook
himself at times resorted to a version of this external explanation of legal change where he suggested
that the failure of the First Restatement was attributable to its inability to adapt to the new scale of
complexity of the modern world: ‘Just as in physics, chemistry and biology today’s theories are much
more complex than those current in the Victorian period, so in the field of legal science theories if they
are to be adequate must take account of the complexities of modern social economic life.’” Riles, supra
note 5, at 1017.
94. See, e.g., Lawrence Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 343 (1990).
95. Anthropologist Marilyn Strathern notes that questions of scale always plague analytical
projects, such that the relative simplicity or complexity of the framing of a problem (or by extension its
solution) is part of the process of setting out the parameters of the study. See MARILYN STRATHERN,
PARTIAL CONNECTIONS, (AltaMira Press updated ed., 2004) (1991).
96. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997);
Bangoura I, 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564 para. 30 (Can.); SOCAN I, [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 para. 84 (Can.).
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (8th ed. 2004).
98. Supra II.A.
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connecting factors in that case to the issue whether the defamation could
properly be said to have occurred in Texas.99 Similarly in Gutnick and Dow
Jones, the courts determined that the place where the defamation occurred was
the Australian state of Victoria, which eliminated the need to consider other
jurisdictional and choice-of-law issues.100 Many American cases have likewise
turned on the interpretation of states’ long-arm statutes,101 which tend to feature
lex loci delicti rules.102
A prominent subset of cases embracing a formalist approach reaches for
further simplicity by positing that Internet technology itself should determine
the place where the tort, contract, or other legal relationship occurred.103 An
example of such an embrace of simplicity is the Copyright Board of Canada’s
conclusion in what became SOCAN III on its appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada:104 “Communications occur at the site of the server from which the work
is transmitted, without regard to the origin of the request or the location of the
original Web site.”105 The Board elaborated that the “place of origin of the
request, the location of the person posting the content and the location of the
original Web site are irrelevant.”106 Such a “place of the server” rule has been
endorsed by some legal scholars as ensuring a desirable predictability in online
disputes, as well as by dissenting Supreme Court of Canada Justice LeBel in
SOCAN III; he stated that such a rule “provides a straightforward and logical
rule for locating communications occurring within Canada that will be readily
applicable by the Board in setting tariffs, by the courts in infringement
proceedings, and by solicitors in providing advice to their clients.”107
By reducing the determination of jurisdiction and choice-of-law to a
question of the location of the tort or the location of a physical machine, these

99. Braintech, Inc. v. Kostiuk, [1999] 171 D.L.R. (4th) 46 (Can.).
100. Dow Jones (2002) 194 A.L.R. 433 paras. 48, 51, 52 (Austl.); Gutnick (2001) VSC 305 para. 124,
130 (Austl.). The court in Dow Jones noted that the plaintiff has limited his suit to damages sustained in
Victoria, Australia, for publications in Victoria, and that if the plaintiff had sought to sue for damages
resulting from publications elsewhere, that the court would have had to undergo a different analysis,
taking into account the reasonableness of the publisher’s actions in those locations. Dow Jones, 194
A.L.R. 433 para 49 (Austl.).
101. See, e.g., Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242–44 (2d Cir. 2007); People Solutions,
Inc., v. People Solutions, Inc., No. 399-CV-2339, 2000 WL 1030619, at *1–2 (U.S. Dist. Tex. July 25,
2000).
102. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (8th ed. 2004).
103. Many early judgments involving the Internet devoted a significant portion of the decision to
explaining how Internet technology works. These lengthy descriptions are also a symptom of the
disruption caused by the Internet, in that the relevance of the technical features of the Internet to the
facts of the case is often unclear and tenuous, resulting in an excess of technical description. See, e.g.,
Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849–54 (1997).
104. SOCAN III, [2004] 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.).
105. SOCAN I, [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 para. 84 (Can.), rev’d in part, SOCAN III, [2004] 240
D.L.R. (4th) 193 (Can.).
106. Id. para 151. The Board concedes one proviso to this rule—that content specifically intended to
be communicated to Canadians may also be considered to occur “in Canada”—though the Board
merely considers this issue to remain open. Id. para 155.
107. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 at para. 146 (Can.) (LeBel, J., dissenting).

SLANE__BOOK PROOF_FINAL.DOC

Summer 2008]

10/27/2008 7:58:23 AM

TALES, TECHS, AND TERRITORIES

147

approaches claim that a straightforward rule makes both the conduct of
business and the administration of law easier and more predictable, and hence
fairer. Some legal scholars have endorsed a view that the Internet calls for such
straightforward, predictable rules.108 Those espousing the complexity approach,
however, also claim a greater likelihood of achieving fairness by considering
simple rules to be arbitrary and more likely to produce unjust results in
individual cases than a complex multiple-factor analysis.109
B. Applying Connecting Factors Methods: Protecting Home Interests or a
New Conception of Jurisdiction?
In Canada, Supreme Court Justice La Forest set out a complex approach
weighing factors that assess whether a “real and substantial connection” exists
between the dispute and the jurisdiction as more appropriate to global human
society:
It seems to me that the approach of permitting suit where there is a real and
substantial connection with the action provides a reasonable balance between the
rights of the parties. It affords some protection against being pursued in jurisdictions
having little or no connection with the transaction or the parties. In a world where
even the most familiar things we buy and sell originate or are manufactured
elsewhere, and where people are constantly moving from province to province, it is
simply anachronistic to uphold a “power theory” or a single situs for torts or contracts
110
for the proper exercise of jurisdiction.

A second line of Internet cases similarly eschews the simplified, formalist
approach in favor of multi-factor methods for determining whether a sufficient
connection exists between the suit and the forum.111 In Canada, the analysis
involves considering a range of factors regarding the relationships between the
parties, the cause of action and the various implicated locations so as to
determine whether the suit has a “real and substantial connection” to the
forum.112 In the United States, this type of analysis tends to be more defendantfocused, namely by looking at whether the defendant has passed the threshold
of “minimum contacts” with the forum113 and whether exercising jurisdiction
would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial choice”
guaranteed by the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.114
108. See, e.g., Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1347 (2001) (Geist includes implied intent to target as
sufficient in some circumstances, such as defamation, though the contours of this implied intent are not
elaborated and remain defendant-focused); see also Julie L. Henn, Targeting Transnational Internet
Content Regulation, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 157, 158 (2003); Andrew F. Halaby, You Won’t Be Back: Making
Sense of “Express Aiming” After Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625, 661
(2005).
109. See, e.g., Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Borders on, or Border Around—The Future of the Internet,
16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 343, 373–80 (2006).
110. Morguard Invs. Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 para. 51 (Can.) (emphasis added).
111. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 59–61 (Can.); Bangoura II, 258 D.L.R. (4th) 341 para.
46; Burke v. NYP Holdings, Inc., [2005] 48 B.C.L.R. 363 para. 29 (Can.).
112. Morguard Invs. Ltd., 3 S.C.R. 1077 para. 51 (Can.).
113. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
114. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
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The most prominent Canadian case touching on online jurisdiction and
employing the “real and substantial connection” approach is the Supreme
Court of Canada’s decision in SOCAN III. Interestingly enough, SOCAN III
was not a typical private-international-law dispute; rather, it concerned the
authority of the Copyright Board of Canada to impose a tariff on parties
involved in the communication of copyright-protected works to the public via
telecommunications and the Internet.115 In other words, this case cast the issue
whether Canadian territorial law applies to Internet transmissions originating
outside Canada as a private-international-law problem.116 Eschewing the “place
of the server” rule espoused by the Copyright Board,117 the court in SOCAN III
endorsed the “real and substantial connection” approach preferred by the
Federal Court of Appeal118 and highlighted the significance of the end user’s
location in terms of broader public-policy considerations:
At the end of the transmission, the end user has a musical work in his or her
possession that was not there before. The work has, necessarily, been communicated,
irrespective of its point of origin. If the communication is by virtue of the Internet,
there has been a“telecommunication.” To hold otherwise would not only fly in the
face of the ordinary use of language but would have serious consequences in other
areas of law relevant to the Internet, including Canada’s ability to deal with criminal
and civil liability for objectionable communications entering the country from
119
abroad.

The court’s statement brings home the persistent concern expressed in the other
Canadian interjurisdictional cases, as well as in the Australian Gutnick case:
that the crossing of communications into Canada is always at least potentially
significant.120 Making such an observation allows a country of reception to
exercise jurisdiction and apply local law in appropriate circumstances,
depending on the quality of the factors connecting the dispute to the
jurisdiction where the communication was received.
Broad policy reasons protecting home interests are at play in the court’s
categorical refusal to accept the argument that Canada should never assume
jurisdiction merely on the basis of Canadian reception. In order to refine the
analysis for determining which conditions of Canadian reception rise to the
level of real and substantial connection, SOCAN III, like the online defamation
cases, significantly concerns the legal determination of who the relevant

115. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 1 (Can.).
116. Id.
117. SOCAN I, [1999] 1 C.P.R. (4th) 417 para. 84 (Can.), rev’d in part, SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th)
193 (Can.).
118. Soc’y of Composers, Authors & Music Publishers of Can. v. Can. Ass’n of Internet Providers
(SOCAN II), [2002] 4 F.C. 3 para. 186 (Can.), aff’d, SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 44 (Can.).
119. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 45 (Can.).
120. This concern is also expressed in the Australian case, Dow Jones v. NYP Holdings, (2002) 194
A.L.R. 433 (Austl.). The SOCAN III court’s statement draws on the pre-Internet 1985 Supreme Court
of Canada judgment in Libman v. R., which held the any tort touching on multiple jurisdictions occurs
at least “both here and there.” SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para 58–59 (Can.) (quoting Libman v.
R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 para. 74 (Can.)).
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“public” is.121 The court wrote that the “applicability of our Copyright Act to
communications that have international participants will depend on whether
there is a sufficient connection between this country and the communication in
question.”122 In other words, the relevant connection is with the character of the
communication itself, not just the content provider per se. By focusing on
whether Canadians properly constitute a relevant public, recent Canadian cases
employing private-international-law methods seem to be fundamentally
engaged in positioning audiences in relation to the rest of the Internetparticipating world.123 They do so in ways that U.S. online-jurisdiction cases
generally have not, even when U.S. courts do sometimes exercise jurisdiction on
the basis of receipt alone, due to their defendant-oriented analysis.124 In other
words, due to the tendency of U.S. case law to see online audiences as
determined by the intentional actions of the content provider in defamation
actions,125 U.S. courts do not consider the wider array of factors that influence
audience formation that Canadian courts have started to consider.
Canadian courts have therefore turned to a multi-factor approach in order
to justify assuming jurisdiction on the basis of Canadian audiences in some but
not all circumstances, since the multi-factored approach is capable of these sorts
of case-by-case determinations in ways that single-situs rules are not.
Embracing complexity then allows courts to claim that they are not merely
giving weight to concern about undermining sovereign authority over home
territory, but also working at understanding the constitution of online audiences
as global-community members relevant to the disposition of privateinternational-law issues.126 Some legal scholars endorse this type of approach as
most suitable to the globalized world. Paul Schiff Berman, for instance, argues
that “just as a rigidly territorial conception of jurisdiction eventually gave way
in the first part of the twentieth-century to the idea of jurisdiction based on

121. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 42. Here, copyright protects the exclusive right to
communicate the work to the public by telecommunications. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. 42, § 3(1)(f)
(1985).
122. SOCAN III, 240 D.L.R. (4th) 193 para. 57.
123. Id. para. 64.
124. This occurs most often in intellectual-property-infringement cases. See, e.g., Bunn-O-Matic
Corp. v. Bunn Coffee Servs. Inc., No. 97-3259, 1998 WL207860 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1998); Inset Systems,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). One very interesting U.S. case dealing
with the delineation of the legally relevant “public,” Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. Tampa, Florida, is not a
conflict-of-laws case but one concerning the applicability of a municipal ordinance to a business
offering adult entertainment to online audiences. 265 F.3d 1232, 1235 (11th Cir. 2001). The court ruled
that the “public” was scattered in cyberspace, not located in the municipality. Thus, the business was
not subject to the zoning restrictions regarding adult-entertainment establishments. Id. at 1236–37.
125. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
126. Not all Canadian cases are concerned with online community formation. Some have been
exclusively concerned with sovereign authority (either finding that it obtains—as in Lawson v.
Accusearch Inc., [2007] 280 D.L.R. (4th) 358 para. 51 (Can.)—or finding that it does not—as in Desjean
v. Intermix Media, [2006] F.C. 1395 para. 36 (Can.)). Likewise, there have been U.S. cases that appear
to be more concerned with preserving sovereign authority rather than reinforcing a defendant-focused
test for determining minimum contacts. See, e.g., Playboy Ent., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 939 F.
Supp. 1032, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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contacts with a sovereign entity, so too a contacts-based approach must now
yield to a conception of jurisdiction based on community definition.”127 There is
an underlying progress narrative at work in Berman’s argument, in which
complexity is preferable to simplicity in that it is better able to accommodate
change. Whether associating complexity with progress bears out remains to be
seen, but it is enough to say here that complexity is being mobilized in the
service of progress as the best means for ensuring the ongoing relevance of
Canadian audiences in an increasingly internationalized communications
context.
IV
CONCLUSION: THE EVOLVING
SIGNIFICANCE OF BORDERS AND “BORDERLESSNESS”
Dutch artist Lonnie van Brummelen’s 2005 film Grossraum centrally
features silent footage of three border-crossing points at the edges of Europe: at
Hrebenne (between Poland and Ukraine), Ceuta (between Spain and Morroco)
and the disputed “Green Line” in Cyprus (between Greece and Turkey, via
Cyprus).128 Van Brummelen describes her project as revealing the tension
between the European processes of removing internal borders while reinforcing
external borders.129 The footage mainly documents the activity and landscapes at
or near the crossing points without much editing or other intervention by the
artist.
The screening portion of the installation is supplemented with an off-screen
booklet that includes the correspondence between van Brummelen and the
bureaucrats responsible for granting van Brummelen permission to film in each
location. The correspondents voice concern as to how van Brummelen’s project
will cast the significance of being “outside” of an internally borderless Europe;
one contact advises van Brummelen, “[T]he Ukraine does not want to be seen
as an Asian wilderness outside the borders of Europe. They will on the other
hand certainly appreciate the growing interest in the Ukraine as a neighbor of
the European Union.”130 Indeed, the correspondence reveals that van
Brummelen repeatedly ran into sensitivities regarding her filming the “borders
of Europe.”131 These sensitivities blocked the project altogether from filming in
Turkey, despite the artist’s admitting to trying to “make use of the ‘prestige’
and ‘apolitical’ status of art” to get the necessary permissions.132

127. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, supra note 70, at 321.
128. GROSSRAUM (Lonnie van Brummelen 2005).
129. Id.
130. Letter from Darek Szendel to Lonnie van Brummelen, in Lonnie van Brummelen & Siebren de
Haan, THE FORMAL TRAJECTORY, 7 (text accompanying film triptych Grossraum) (on file with
author).
131. Id. at page 26–27.
132. Lonnie van Brummelen, Artist, Master Class given at the Cinematheque Ontario (Apr. 6,
2007) (manuscript on file with author).
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In other words, no matter how innocuously presented, both the dissolution
and the fortification of borders are inherently laden with political and cultural
significance. The project highlights the unevenness of meaning ascribed to
national borders and is consequently an antidote to globalization rhetoric.
The project undertaken in this article is parallel to Grossraum, in that it
tackles the task of charting primarily Canadian private international law’s
evolving orientation to jurisdictional borders and their significance in the online
context. The underlying insight is that, whereas the advent of Internet
communications led to calls for simple, consistent, globally harmonized
approaches to determining jurisdiction and the applicability of local law, this
consistency has ultimately not inspired confidence in Canada, mostly due to the
unequal significance of borders to different populations—especially Canada visà-vis the United States.
The account of Canadian private international law’s encounter with the
Internet as charted in this article reveals that the procedural aspects of the case
law are as engaged in determining the significance of borders as substantive-law
analyses, both of which rely quite heavily on public-policy rationales. On the
procedural plane, competing theories of the appropriateness of simple versus
complex methods each claim greater likelihood of achieving just ends in a
globalized communications environment, but the theories share a common view
that Internet communications are creating multi-jurisdictional relationships that
cannot be so easily territorialized. On the substantive issues, positioning local
law in relation to online disputes has commonly been rhetorically framed either
favorably in terms of cosmopolitanism, or negatively in terms of parochialism.
From the various deployments of cosmopolitanism emerge two parallel moves:
on the one hand, reinforcing or diminishing territorial borders as the
globalization rhetoric predicts, but on the other, determining whether Internetcommunication recipients are members of online communities that are not
strictly territorially constituted. Taken together, the procedural and substantive
aspects of Internet tort cases involving more than one jurisdiction are clearly
grappling with the reconfiguration of audiences in a global communications
environment, a process that requires courts to think both territorially and
supra-territorially at the same time.

